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PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS POST-MAYO 
AND MYRIAD 
Jacob S. Sherkow* 
The Supreme Court has recently expressed increased interest in patent eli-
gibility, or patentable subject matter, the doctrine that limits the types of inven-
tions eligible for patenting. Its two decisions, Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,1 in 2012, and Association for Molecular Pa-
thology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,2 in 2013, represented the first broad re-
strictions on patentable subject matter in over thirty years.3 And later this term, 
the Court will decide yet another patent eligibility case: Alice Corp. v. CLS 
Bank International.4 While the effects of the Mayo and Myriad decisions on 
patent law have been widely discussed, they have recently played a fascinat-
ing—and less explored—role in another area of law: preliminary injunctions. In 
several recent patent cases, the contours of Mayo and Myriad have driven dis-
trict courts to deny preliminary injunctions on patent eligibility grounds. This 
has subtly altered the texture of the preliminary injunction standard in patent 
infringement disputes, causing district courts to place greater emphasis on dif-
ficult, scientifically complex questions of patent eligibility at nascent stages of 
litigation. While time—and appeals—will tell whether this change remains via-
ble, this shift in the preliminary injunction standard provides a fascinating, 
practical case study as to one law: the law of unintended consequences. 
MAYO AND MYRIAD 
In Mayo, the asserted patents claimed a method for adjusting the dosage of 
thiopurine drugs—useful in treating gastrointestinal disease but sometimes tox-
ic—based on specific concentrations of the drugs’ metabolites in patients’ 
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 3. In 2010, the Court decided another patentable subject matter case—Bilski v. Kap-
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clear. See generally Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2011) 
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blood.5 The question presented to the Supreme Court was whether this in-
sight—the specific correlation uncovered by researchers distinguishing thera-
peutic and toxic doses—“preempt[ed] all uses of the naturally occurring corre-
lations” and therefore ran afoul of the Court’s earlier patent eligibility 
jurisprudence.6 While the Court could have decided the case narrowly, it inval-
idated the patents’ claims on rather broad and cryptic terms: the claims failed to 
contain an “inventive concept”;7 they tread on “laws of nature”;8 and they were 
merely “well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged in 
by researchers in the field.”9 
In Myriad, the asserted patents claimed two forms of DNA: human genes 
isolated, in toto, from the genome, called genomic DNA; and a selection of the 
functional, or protein-coding, part of those genes, called cDNA.10 The question 
presented to the Supreme Court in Myriad was deceptively simple: “Are human 
genes patentable?”11 Again, the Court could have disposed of the case on nar-
row, or at least coterminous, grounds. But the Court invalidated the patents’ 
claims to genomic DNA on the theory that they were primarily “informational,” 
while it upheld the patents’ claims to cDNA as primarily “chemical.”12 
In many ways, these decisions have been difficult to interpret. First, the 
Court’s failure to address Mayo in its Myriad decision highlights the “logical 
discontinuity” between the two decisions13: is a new chemical created using 
“well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by re-
searchers in the field” nonetheless patent eligible? Second, the decisions seem 
to join two previously distinct areas of patent ineligibility: “natural laws” and 
“products” on the one hand and “abstract ideas” on the other.14 Third, patent 
eligibility’s long-standing allowance of patents on “natural products” as long as 
they are “isolated and purified” from their surrounding environments now is in 
doubt.15 Being forced to draw the difficult line between molecules that are pri-
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992001. 
 7. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 15. See generally Christopher Beauchamp, Patenting Nature: A Problem of History, 
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marily “informational” and those that are primarily “chemical” further compli-
cates this distinction. And fourth, the ultimate extent to which technologies 
constitute “well-understood, routine, conventional activity, previously engaged 
in by researchers in the field” is potentially troublesome.16 Courts now face the 
unenviable task of harmonizing Mayo and Myriad. 
THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD 
Patent holders, in seeking judgments that their adversaries’ activities in-
fringe their patents, typically ask courts not merely to award damages but to en-
join infringers from particular business activities.17 Part and parcel of these re-
quests are motions for preliminary injunctions—injunctions against the accused 
activity during the pendency of the lawsuit. In assessing preliminary injunc-
tions, courts have used the traditional four-part test: whether the plaintiff has 
proved (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) an irreparable injury, 
(3) that the balance of hardships falls in its favor, and (4) that the public interest 
counsels in favor of a preliminary injunction.18 Because such requests come 
early in the litigation process—indeed, often in tandem with the complaint—
courts must resolve these factors prior to having had an opportunity to issue 
substantive rulings with the aid of substantial discovery. 
In the patent context, these factors are further given their own texture. The 
first prong, likelihood of success on the merits, maps to the ultimate questions 
of infringement and invalidity: whether the patent holder can prove infringe-
ment at trial, and whether the defendant can demonstrate that the patent is, for 
whatever reason, invalid. The second prong usually focuses on whether the pa-
tent holder would suffer “price erosion”—an irreversible drop in prices—if 
competitors enter the marketplace.19 The third typically weighs the relative siz-
 
 16. See Jacob S. Sherkow, And How: Mayo v. Prometheus and the Method of Inven-
tion, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 351, 351 (2013), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/ 
1144_obtqyfxe.pdf. 
 17. Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public In-
terest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 16 (2012) (estimating the injunction rate in infringement suits 
to be around seventy-five percent in district courts). 
 18. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
 19. The texture of this prong may soon change. In Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. 
Sandoz, Inc., Chief Justice John G. Roberts recently expressed the opinion that Teva was not 
entitled to a stay of the Federal Circuit’s mandate invalidating some of its patents. The Chief 
Justice expressed skepticism that Teva would suffer “irreparable harm” if the mandate was 
not stayed because “should Teva prevail in this Court and its patent be held valid, Teva will 
be able to recover damages from respondents for past patent infringement,” despite suffering 
from price erosion. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 13A1003 (13-854), 2014 
WL 1516642 (U.S. Apr. 18, 2014) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers). How well the “irreparable 
harm” prong for stays of appellate mandates aligns with the “irreparable harm” prong of pre-
liminary injunctions remains to be seen, but—as with Mayo and Myriad—the Court’s words 
here may further alter district courts’ interpretations of the standard in patent disputes. 
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es of the parties. And the fourth, at least historically, centered on the “strong 
public interest in upholding a patentee’s exclusive rights.”20  
These factors—combined with a legal presumption of patent validity—
typically tipped in favor of the patent holder, long making preliminary injunc-
tions a “potent weapon in patent litigation.”21 Famously, in Hybritech, Inc. v. 
Abbott Laboratories, the district court granted a preliminary injunction to pre-
vent the sale of Abbott’s antibody assays despite expressing doubt over every 
one of the four prongs.22 At the time, however—over twenty years before the 
Supreme Court’s foray into patent eligibility—there was little doubt that Hy-
britech’s inventions, or any inventions like them, were patentable subject mat-
ter. Times have changed. 
ARIA AND AMBRY 
Mayo and Myriad’s lack of clarity, combined with their broad, sweeping 
statements about the doctrine of patent eligibility, have added a particular wrin-
kle to requests for preliminary injunctions: despite patents’ presumption of va-
lidity, courts appear to have become more emboldened to deny preliminary in-
junctions on the grounds that the asserted patents are likely to be invalid for 
lack of patentable subject matter. That is, it seems that courts have begun to use 
the vagaries of Mayo and Myriad as a way to deny—and subtly alter the stand-
ards for—preliminary injunctions. Two recent district court cases, Aria Diag-
nostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.23 and In re BRCA1- and BRCA2-Based Heredi-
tary Cancer Test Patent Litigation (Ambry),24 demonstrate this development. 
A. Aria 
In Aria, the asserted patent claimed a method of detecting certain fetal ge-
netic abnormalities, such as Down syndrome, using a simple, noninvasive 
blood test of the pregnant mother.25 The heart of the invention focused on the 
insight that some of the carrying mother’s blood would likely contain some of 
 
 20. See In re BRCA1- and BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig. (Am-
bry), No. 2:14-MD-2510, 2014 WL 931057, at *56 (D. Utah Mar. 10, 2014). 
 21. James J. Foster, The Preliminary Injunction—A “New” and Potent Weapon in Pa-
tent Litigation, 68 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 281, 281 (1986) (capitalization altered); 
see M.A. Cunningham, Preliminary Injunctive Relief in Patent Litigation, 35 IDEA 213, 231 
(1995) (assessing the preliminary injunction grant rate in patent cases to be sixty-one percent 
between October 1, 1982, and December 31, 1993).  
 22. No. CV 86-7461/AK (PX), 1987 WL 123997 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 1987), aff’d, 849 
F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 23. No. C 11-06391 SI, 2012 WL 2599340, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2012), vacated, 
726 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 24. 2014 WL 931057, at *1-2. 
 25. U.S. Patent No. 6,258,540 col. 23 ll. 61-68 (filed Mar. 4, 1998). 
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the fetus’s DNA, known as cell-free fetal DNA, or cffDNA.26 On Sequenom’s 
request for a preliminary injunction, the district court considered whether “the 
discovery that fetal DNA is detectable in maternal [blood] . . . is an unpatenta-
ble natural phenomenon under Mayo.”27 
Prior to Mayo, this analysis—at least in the context of requests for prelimi-
nary injunctions—would have strongly favored Sequenom, the patent holder. 
Patents are entitled to a presumption of validity, which can only be undone by 
“clear and convincing” evidence—a difficult burden prior to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Mayo.28 Furthermore, the burden of proof regarding inva-
lidity rests on the accused infringer.29 
But Mayo’s elusive language regarding which inventions constitute un-
patentable “natural phenomena” through “well-understood, routine, conven-
tional activity” provided Aria—and a skeptical district court—with at least a 
“substantial question” as to the validity of Sequenom’s patent. A method for 
analyzing cffDNA, while clearly not an “abstract idea” under the Supreme 
Court’s pre-Mayo jurisprudence, now potentially fell within the realm of pa-
tent-ineligible “natural phenomena.” And the procedures used to quantify 
cffDNA—revolutionary from a market perspective30—could, in some sense, be 
considered no more than a creative application of “standard” (i.e., “well-
understood, routine, conventional”) techniques in molecular biology.31 These 
arguments—almost certainly losers prior to Mayo—led the district court to ul-
timately deny Sequenom’s request for a preliminary injunction because “Se-
quenom ha[d] not put forward substantial evidence that the steps described in 
the specification [were] ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice 
amount[ed] to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself.’”32 
This concern with whether there exists “substantial evidence” to overcome 
the practice of a “natural law,” however, marks a subtle shift in preliminary in-
junction jurisprudence. Accurately assessing questions of patent eligibility re-
quires more than rote legal conclusions. As the Federal Circuit recently de-
clared, conclusions concerning patent eligibility are “rife with underlying 
factual issues”33—complex, sophisticated factual issues difficult to determine 
at nascent stages of litigation. Whether cffDNA constitutes a natural phenome-
non under Mayo implicates scientific, technological, and even philosophical 
inquiries poorly positioned for resolution on requests for preliminary injunc-
 
 26. Aria, 2012 WL 2599340, at *2. 
 27. Id. at *11 (citation omitted).  
 28. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011).  
 29. Id. at 2245. 
 30. See Aria, 2012 WL 2599340, at *3 (listing the potential market for cffDNA analy-
sis as 750,000 patients). 
 31. See id. at *12 (“However, the steps Sequenom used to enable their method claims 
in light of the cell-free DNA discovery—namely fractionation (separating blood into cells 
and plasma), amplification, and detection—are described as ‘standard’ in the patent itself.”).  
 32. Id.  
 33. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
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tions.34 And whether anything constitutes “well-understood, routine, conven-
tional” techniques likely requires on-the-ground analysis of scientific practice, 
better analyzed after substantial discovery.35 By placing its focus on the first 
preliminary injunction prong—likelihood of success on the merits—the district 
court subtly moved the preliminary injunction standard from the preliminary to 
the permanent, from a rudimentary calculus of harms to one fully engaged with 
scientific fact. 
B. Ambry 
In Ambry, a suit brought by Myriad after the fallout from its earlier Su-
preme Court loss, the district court employed a similar analysis. Almost imme-
diately after the Court’s decision, several competitors, including Ambry Genet-
ics, boldly announced that they were planning to directly compete with Myriad 
by offering BRCA1 and BRCA2 sequencing services to detect breast cancer 
risk.36 Myriad subsequently brought suit against several companies on its re-
maining patent claims—including those expressly found to be patent eligible by 
the Supreme Court—and asked the district court to enter a preliminary injunc-
tion against Ambry.37 
Although this factual and procedural posture makes it difficult, if not im-
possible, to conceive of Ambry in the absence of Myriad, two facets of the Myr-
iad decision appeared to strongly support Myriad’s request for a preliminary 
injunction. First, the Supreme Court had specifically declared that Myriad’s 
cDNA claims were eligible for patent protection. Second, Myriad’s remaining 
claims were still afforded the same presumptions of validity given to any issued 
claims: they could only be invalidated by a showing of “clear and convincing” 
evidence. Neither facet strongly suggested that Ambry would have likely suc-
ceeded on the merits. Nonetheless, the district court fully engaged the parties 
on the technological issues surrounding patent ineligibility, receiving thousands 
of pages of scientific material, presiding over a two-day “technology tutorial,” 
and crafting a 106-page opinion, the bulk of which detailed the parties’ scien-
tific arguments.38  
Ultimately, it was those scientific arguments that formed the backbone of 
the court’s denial of Myriad’s request for a preliminary injunction. The Ambry 
court declared that Myriad’s synthetic DNA patents were likely invalid be-
cause, according to the Myriad decision itself, the claimed synthetic DNA se-
 
 34. See Jacob S. Sherkow, The Natural Complexity of Patent Eligibility, 99 IOWA L. 
REV. 1137, 1139 (2014).  
 35. See Sherkow, supra note 16, at 356-57.  
 36. See Ambry, No. 2:14-MD-2510, 2014 WL 931057, at *1 (D. Utah Mar. 10, 2014). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at *1-30. 
May 2014] PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS 7 
quences were not “distinct from the DNA from which it was derived”39—a 
conclusion based in part on the court’s own analysis of the genetic sequences at 
issue.40 Further, the court declared that Myriad’s claims directed to methods of 
using its synthetic DNA were also likely invalid because, under Mayo, those 
methods failed to contain an “inventive concept” according to the court’s reci-
tation of the state of the art in molecular biology as it existed twenty years prior 
(when Myriad had filed for its patent).41 
Like the court’s analysis in Aria, this nuanced, scholarly focus on how 
Mayo and Myriad apply to truly difficult questions of molecular biology subtly 
shifts the preliminary injunction analysis from the passing to the painstaking. 
The court’s thorough analysis of the complementarity of genetic sequences and 
the history of molecular biology, and its valiant attempt to harmonize the Su-
preme Court’s disparate patentable subject matter jurisprudence, belongs—if it 
belongs anywhere—on papers for summary judgment, after the parties have 
thoroughly engaged in discovery, narrowed the issues in dispute, and had time 
to prepare expert rebuttal reports. 
THE FUTURE OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS 
Mayo and Myriad, as seen through Aria and Ambry, provide some insight 
into the future of preliminary injunctions. In patent cases, it seems clear that 
courts will increasingly engage in substantive issues of patent eligibility on re-
quests for preliminary injunctions—and in doing so, increasingly deny them on 
the grounds that the asserted patents are ineligible for protection. While judges 
may feel that Mayo and Myriad give them broad leeway for such denials, the 
opinions’ cryptic language and legal nuances make preliminary injunctions a 
poor forum for such deliberation. Patent holders, when requesting preliminary 
injunctions, should now be prepared to make full-throated defenses of their in-
ventions’ eligibility. 
Relatedly, Aria and Ambry also seem to show that district courts now ap-
pear more willing to imbue the latter three preliminary injunction factors with 
their result in the first. In the Ambry case, for example, the district court’s anal-
ysis of the public interest factor—historically pro-patentee—presumed the neg-
ative utility of Myriad’s patents: they “hindered rather than promoted innova-
tion,” “distort[ed] rather than serve[d] the patent system[],” and utilized “a 
commercial path that turns much of our patent system policy on its head.”42 
This all but suggests that the court’s thorough analysis as to whether Myriad 
was likely to succeed on the merits simply became a mandate for the remaining 
parcels of equity. While it is true that the first prong, likelihood of success on 
 
 39. Id. at *44 (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. 
Ct. 2107, 2119 (2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 40. Id. at *46.  
 41. Id. at *49-54.  
 42. Id. at *57.  
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the merits, is the most important preliminary injunction factor, it is still but one 
factor of four. The preliminary injunction standard should be an independent, 
holistic balancing of each. Where the likelihood-of-success question is close or 
exceedingly difficult—as it doubtless will be in many patent disputes after 
Mayo and Myriad—that should counsel courts to pay more, and more serious, 
attention to the remaining factors, not less. 
More broadly, this subtle shift in preliminary injunctions paints an interest-
ing picture of some of the unintended effects of Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
Mayo and Myriad were not decisions of clarity—nor were they meant to be—
but they were necessary attempts to prune a thorny and wild area of patent law. 
The opinions, if anything, counsel a careful deliberation of technology and law, 
with an implicit understanding that such analyses were difficult. But these cau-
tions have taken on a character of their own in the rapidly moving, partially 
blind atmosphere of preliminary injunctions. This is all a greater lesson that an 
appellate court’s desire for care can be a trial court’s command to haste. 
